#### As a Chinese female, adoptee I recognize my privilege and the opportunities America has given me. However, I also recognize how the state and the institution has oppressed minorities.

#### Mathematics – Mos Def

Yo, it's one universal law but two sides to every story

Three strikes and you be in for life, manditory

Four MC's murdered in the last four years

I ain't tryin to be the fifth one, the millenium is here

Yo it's 6 Million Ways to Die, from the seven deadly thrills

Eight-year olds gettin found with 9 mill's

It's 10 P.M., where your seeds at? What's the deal

He on the hill puffin krill to keep they belly filled

Light in the ass with heavy steel, sights on the pretty shit in life

Young soldiers tryin to earn they next stripe

When the average minimum wage is $5.15

You best believe you gotta find a new ground to get cream

The white unemployment rate, is nearly more than triple for black

so frontliners got they gun in your back

Bubblin crack, jewel theft and robbery to combat poverty

and end up in the global jail economy

Stiffer stipulations attached to each sentence

Budget cutbacks but increased police presence

And even if you get out of prison still livin

join the other five million under state supervision

This is business, no faces just lines and statistics

from your phone, your zip code, to S-S-I digits

#### Being ignorant of your privilege and success in relation to whiteness re-inscribes an unspoken and supplemental antiblackness.

Sullivan, 8

(Professor Philosophy, Women’s Studies, and African and African American Studies @ Pennsylvania State University (Shannon Sullivan, Spring 2008, “Whiteness as Wise Provincialism: Royce and the Rehabilitation of a Racial Category,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Vol. 44, No. 2, Project Muse)

Like critical conservationists regarding whiteness, Royce knows that he faces an uphill battle in convincing many of his interlocutors of the value of provincialism. Put positively, provincialism tends to connote a healthy fondness for and pride in local traditions, interests, and customs. More negatively, it means being restricted and limited, sticking to the narrow ideas of a given region or group and being indifferent, perhaps even violently hostile to the ways of outsiders. What connects these different meanings is their sense of being rooted in a particular cultural-geographical place. In Royce’s definition, which emphasizes conscious awareness of this rootedness (an important point to which I will return), a province is a domain that is “sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from other(s).” And correspondingly, provincialism is, first, the tendency for a group “to possess its own customs and ideals; secondly, the totality of these customs and ideals themselves; and thirdly the love and pride which leads the inhabitants of a province to cherish as their own these traditions, beliefs and aspirations” (61). (End Page 238) Emphasizing unity, love, and pride, Royce’s definitions steer away from the negative connotations of provincialism. But in Royce’s day—and not much has changed in this regard—it was the negative, or “false,” form of provincialism that most often came to people’s minds when they thought about the value and effects of the concept. As Royce was writing in 1902, the false provincialism, or “sectionalism,” of the United States’ Civil War was a recent memory for many of his readers. In the Civil War, stubborn commitment to one portion of the nation violently opposed it to another portion and threatened to tear the nation apart. Provincialism, which appealed to regional values to disunite, had to be condemned in the name of patriotism, which united in the name of a higher good. Royce’s rhetorical strategy is to take the challenge of defending provincialism head-on: “My main intention is to define the right form and the true office of provincialism—to portray what, if you please, we may call the Higher Provincialism, —to portray it, and then to defend it, to extol it, and to counsel you to further just such provincialism” (65). Royce readily acknowledges that “against the evil forms of sectionalism we shall always have to contend” (64). But he denies that provincialism must always be evil. Going against the grain of most post-Civil War thinking about provincialism, Royce urges that the present state of civilization, both in the world at large, and with us, in America, is such as to define a new social mission which the province alone, but not the nation, is able to fulfil (sic) . . . .(T)he modern world has reached a point where it needs, more than ever before, the vigorous development of a highly organized provincial life. Such a life, if wisely guided, will not mean disloyalty to the nation. (64) Wisely developed, provincialism need not conflict with national loyalty. The two commitments can—and must, Royce insists—flourish together. Likewise, whiteness need not conflict with membership in humanity as a whole. The two identities can—and must—flourish together. The relationship between provincialism and nationalism, as discussed by Royce, serves as a fruitful model for the relationship of whiteness and humanity, and critical conservationists of whiteness should follow Royce’s lead by taking head-on the challenge of critically defending whiteness. Like embracing provincialism, embracing whiteness might seem to be a step backward for the modern world—toward limitation and insularity that breed ignorance, prejudice, and hostility toward others who are different from oneself. Like having a national rather than provincial worldview, seeing oneself as a member of humanity rather than of the white race seems to embody an expansive, outward (End Page 239) orientation that is open to others. But there is a “new social mission” with respect to racial justice that whiteness, and not humanity as a whole, can fulfill. Race relations, especially in the United States, have reached a point where humanity needs a “highly organized” anti-racist whiteness, that is, an anti-racist whiteness that is consciously developed and embraced. How then can we (white people, in particular) wisely guide the development of such whiteness so that it does not result in disloyalty to other races and humanity as a whole? Before addressing this question, let me point out two important differences between whiteness and provincialism as described by Royce. First, while Royce calls for the development of a wise form of provincialism, he is able to appeal to existing “wholesome” forms of provincialism in his defense of the concept. He addresses himself “in the most explicit terms, to men and women who, as I hope and presuppose, are and wish to be, in the wholesome sense, provincial,” and his demand that “the man of the future . . . love his province more than he does to-day” recognizes a nugget of wise provincialism on which to build (65, 67). The development of wise provincialism does not have to be from scratch. In contrast, it is more difficult to pinpoint a nugget of “wholesome” whiteness to use as a starting point for its transformation. Instances of white people who helped slaves and resisted slavery in the United States, for example, certainly can be found—the infamous John Brown is only one such example—but such people often are seen as white race traitors who represent the abolition, not the transformation of whiteness.9 The task of critically conserving whiteness probably will be more difficult than that of critically conserving provincialism since there is not a straightforward or obvious “right form and true office” of whiteness to extol. Second, true to his idealism, Royce describes both provincialism and its development as explicitly conscious phenomena. Royce notes the elasticity of the term “province”—it can designate a small geographical area in contrast with the nation, or it can designate a large geographical, rural area in contrast with a city (57–58)—but it always includes consciousness of the province’s unity and particular identity as this place and not another. Put another way, probably every space, regardless of its size, is distinctive in some way or another. What gives members of a space a provincial attitude is their conscious awareness of, and resulting pride in, that space as the distinctive place that it is. On Royce’s model, someone who is provincial knows that she is, at least in some loose way. The task of developing her provincialism, then, is to develop her rudimentary conscious awareness of her province, to become “more and not less self-conscious, well-established, and earnest” in her provincial outlook (67). In contrast—and here lies the largest difference between provincialism and whiteness—many white people today do not consciously think of themselves as members of this (white) race and not another, not even loosely. Excepting members of white militant groups such as the Ku (End Page 240) Klux Klan or the Creativity Movement, contemporary white people do not tend to have a conscious sense of unity as fellow white people, nor do they consciously invoke or share special ideals, customs, or common memories as white people. They often are perceived and perceive themselves as raceless, as members of the human species at large rather than members of a particular racial group. This does not eliminate their whiteness or their membership in a fairly unified group. Just the opposite: such “racelessness” is one of the marks and privileges of membership in whiteness, especially middle and upper class forms of whiteness. White people can feel a pride in the ideals and customs of whiteness and possess a sense of distinction from people of other races without much, if any conscious awareness of their whiteness and without consciously identifying those ideals and customs as white. To take one brief example, styles and customs of communication in classrooms tend to be raced (as well as classed and gendered), and white styles of discussion, hand-raising, and turn-taking tend to be treated as appropriate while black styles are seen as inappropriate.10 White students often learn to feel proud and validated by their teachers as good students when they participate in these styles, and this almost always happens without either students or teachers consciously identifying their style (or themselves) as white. Such students appear to belong and experience themselves as belonging merely to a group of smart, orderly, responsible students, not to a racialized group. In the United States and Western world more broadly, unconscious habits of whiteness and white privilege have tended to increase after the end of de jure racism.11 Unlike provincialism as described by Royce, whiteness tends to operate more sub- and unconsciously than consciously. But I do not think that this fact spoils wise provincialism as a fruitful model for wise whiteness. First, and reflecting a basic philosophical disagreement that I have with Royce’s idealism, I doubt that provincialism always functions as consciously as Royce suggests it does. The unity, pride, and love that are the hallmarks of provincialism could easily function in the form of unreflective beliefs, habits, preferences, and even bodily comportment. In fact I would argue that many aspects of our provincial loyalties—whatever type of province is at issue—operate on sub- or unconscious levels. In that case, provincialism and whiteness would not be as dissimilar in their operation as Royce’s description implies. Second, even if provincialism tends to consciously unify people while whiteness does not, Royce’s advice that people should attempt to become more, rather than less self-conscious in their provincialism still applies to white people with respect to their whiteness. Given whiteness’s history as a racial category of violent exclusion and oppression, one might think that white people need to focus less on their whiteness, to distance themselves from it. But just the opposite is the case. Given (End Page 241) that distance from racial identification tends to be the covert modus operandi for contemporary forms of white privilege, white people who wish to fight racism need to become more intimately acquainted with their whiteness. Rather than ignore their whiteness, which allows unconscious habits of white privilege to proliferate unchecked, white people need to bring their whiteness to as much conscious awareness as possible (while also realizing that complete self-transparency is never achievable) so that they can try to change what it means.

#### Whiteness is performed. Within debate space it is not simply enough to be ‘antiracist,’ but rather changing the way we perform ourselves in the debate space is the only way to combat whiteness.

Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley et al, 13

(Dr. Shanara R. Reid-Brinkley, PhD, Assistant Professor of Public Address and Advocacy, Director of Debate, William Pitt Debating Union, Amber Kelsie, M.A., Nicholas Brady, 2013, http://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/, Accessed 1/25/14, NC)

There is no racism without bodies coded and trained through practice. There are subjectivities that are raced which means that there are bodies that “look white” that are implicated in whiteness. White privilege in this frame can be recognized as an unearned benefit while offering a position of redemption when privilege is used toward anti-racist efforts. Yet, one can simultaneously be engaged in good anti-racist work as a white person, while engaging in political and social actions that reproduce privilege. And yet, we already recognize that whiteness is not just about skin color, though we cannot deny the existence of white-skin privilege. Whiteness is normative—it produces behavioral and performative patterns that sustain the significance of whiteness as a signifier. Bankey critiques what he calls “Reid-Brinkley’s model for resistance in the flesh” as a failed political project with dangerous implications for contemporary debate practice.

#### Hip Hop Lives – KRS-One

Hip means to know, it's a form of intelligence

To be hip is to be update and relevant

Hop is a form of movement

You can't just observe a hop, you gotta hop up and do it

Hip and hop is more than music

Hip is the knowledge, hop is the movement

Hip and Hop is intelligent movement

Or relevant movement we sellin the music

So write this down on your black books and journals

Hip hop culture is eternal

Run and tell all your friends

An ancient civilization has bee born again, it's a fact

#### Hip Hop is an intelligent movement that functions to break down the normative culture of debate and creates a potential for radical communal change.

Dr. Reid-Brinkley, 8

("THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE")

For these debaters, **the use of hip hop functions to create an aesthetic community within the often hostile space of the debate community.** In essence, **the use of this music overwhelms a space that would normally be uncomfortable.** **I remember walking down the hallway at a** national college **tournament and being drawn to the deep sounds of a hip hop base beat emanating from the walls**. I stood outside and peeped through the small plastic window and it was a young Louisville team. **The use of hip hop invaded the quiet and stillness of the tournament hallway** as debate rounds are in session. **The normal sounds of someone’s rapid fire of words and** cacophony of **gasps** (debaters must take quick and deep breaths periodically to maintain the speed) **or muted notes of the timer beeping, papers shuffling, and the screech of chairs sliding against the cold floors were ripped away in an instant. Only the beat remained**

#### Traditional knowledge production in debate leads to epistemological myopia, The Alt offers an alternative method of the three-tier process, which does not exclude, but augments traditional knowledge production.

Dr. Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department Of Communications, 8

("THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE" pages 81-83) (\*\*\*Edited for ablist language)

The process of **signifyin**’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters **is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence; their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”** In other words, **those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These** legitimating **practices** usually **function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledge-making practices,** while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making practices**.** The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.” Jones and Green offer **an alternative framework for drawing claims**in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. Andwe talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three ~~blind folded~~ [masked] people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then **you can achieve a greater truth.”** Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the double-octo-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets**,** **through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.**” The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, **personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence.** While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how **when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless.** That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. **That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop.** That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you **don’t get just one perspective** **claiming to be the right way.** **Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education.**The use of **hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse.** Note the reference to bell hooks, Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term **rootless** seems to **refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances** that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that **which they study.** For the Louisville debaters, **this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.**¶

#### This Alternative form of knowledge production leads to a double conscious. The inclusion of personal narratives allows us to reflect on out own social location, while alternate forms of knowledge allow us to understand the oppression of others. By teaching code switching we allow intra-communal discussion.

Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley et al, 13

(Dr. Shanara R. Reid-Brinkley, PhD, Assistant Professor of Public Address and Advocacy, Director of Debate, William Pitt Debating Union, Amber Kelsie, M.A., Nicholas Brady, 2013, http://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/, Accessed 1/25/14, NC)

Bankey’s positioning of himself at the borderland while excluding (multiply situated) black people in debate from that same space makes little sense to those familiar with the history of race in America. Black people have never not had to be in close relation to whiteness. This is Dubois’ theory of double consciousness (which, though especially emblematic of black experience, is a way of understanding the world that can be learned by non-blacks). Black people have always existed in an in-between space of blackness and whiteness with anti-blackness serving as the context for this relationship. Black folks in America are always already in an interracial relationship with whiteness; this is especially true in the context of debate. The tone of Bankey’s criticism assumes black people exclude white people from their space, but MPJ and other debate practices demonstrate the direct manner in which white people exclude black people from interracial dialogue in the debate space. An even more recent example of how structural racism functions is the exclusion of Elijah Smith, the reigning NDT champ, from the Kentucky Round Robin, and the attempt to change the rules pertaining to transfer students. We are disappointed by this addition to the consistent complaint made by whites that black people must be constantly accessible to whites even while white people disavow the structure of policed segregation in supposedly common spaces. In fact, it seems quite likely that this thesis will inspire debate arguments that produce exclusions of black students rather than an inclusive space of participation. We find it highly unlikely that it will produce an authentic communication or disalienation. There are countless examples of the manner in which black people attempt to meet the communicative and bodily expectations of dominant culture and dominant debate. Code-switching is part and parcel of our interracial romance with debate, an example of our commitment to compromise. Black people often code-switch into “white-people speak” when dealing with white people while using black language and tonal intonations (regionally specific) when in majority black spaces (in fact, it seems that it is when we “speak authentically” in the presence of whites—share ourselves with whites—that we are charged with the crime of being “intentionally” unintelligible). Within debates, (vis-à-vis framework for example) there is a denial or a disavowal of even the possibility of an engagement across rhetorical difference, which is the move Bankey makes. He refuses to code switch in the thesis by not attempting to understand the kinship networks in debate for black people or to engage in rhetorical practices to demonstrate a commitment to engaging difference at the level of method and performance.[9] How often do we encounter white people who can code-switch (and no we don’t mean the latest hip hop slang) into the communicative and socio-political practices of black culture? The black is always already at the borderland. But double consciousness is something that for most people—especially non-blacks—must be learned and practiced. We believe that these kinds of practices and attempts on the part of black people to meet whites more than half-way are evident for those who choose to see. But also we must point out that in communication studies code-switching, the vernacular, counter-publics, and many other concepts evoke the double-sidedness of rhetorical practice in ways that complicate the very notion that there could ever be a pure communication. We therefore invite Bankey to read the Communication Studies section of the library as well as the Black Studies section.

#### Fiat is illusory. There is no state, only the state of debate. We cannot actually fiat changes for foreign policy, but we can talk about personal experience by asserting individual agency. We are not going to pretend to be the Usfg so we can pretend 1AC gets passed when the judge votes aff. This normative way of debate disconnects you, you are constantly PRETENDING to be something you’re not.

Polson, 2012

(Dana Roe Polson, Co-Director, teacher, founder of ConneXions Community Leadership Academy, “Longing for Theory: Performance Debate in Action”, http://media.proquest.com/media/pq/classic/doc/2719387941/fmt/ai/rep/NPDF?\_s=QsK9GR%2Bx6bq%2BwLv%2BLzDyWm%2BcJH8%3D, RH)

\*\*Edited for gendered language

One of the ways performance debaters see themselves *doing something* as opposed to *just talking* is a concept they call *in-round solvency*. If something about a debater’s argument is addressed and solved for in the round, then she has *in-round solvency*. The concept of *in-round solvency* only makes sense in non-traditional speeches; traditional debaters would not claim in-round solvency for an argument that depends on the US government to enact. While fiat says that for the sake of the debate round, we will all pretend that there would be no barriers to enact the plan (the opponents cannot argue that there’s no way that would be approved in the real world; fiat says that we assume the plan could be approved), no one is saying that the round itself does enact. **The power of discourse, then, is different in performance debate arguments because the actor is not the USFG, but, in some cases, the debaters themselves; the focus is often not the *state* but the *state of debate*. There is a radical shift in who has potential agency**. As Janice Cooper says, “We talk about specifically affirming... ourselves in this round, like that’s an act of actual in-round solvency, because we in this round are like the most oppressed....” The response of more traditional debaters to performance debate arguments is often to downplay or avoid them. Janice says that she and her partner make “real” arguments, and she hopes that “the debate community will start to realize that, like, we’re not just talking,like we’re actually making real arguments they should actually try to prepare for and actually look out for” (Cooper, interview, p. 15).¶ **I heard more than once the argument that talking about issues of race during a debate round, where it could actually have an impact, is different from talking about** (in the sense of pretending to make) foreign policy changes. I think that individual agency is the key to the argument here. The playing-the-game takes away from individual agency; not playing a game, i.e., performance debate, asserts individual agency and is therefore doing something. Kenneth explained this position:¶ A lot of teams like to participate in some hypothetical world where...the affirmative pretends to be the federal government, and ... when the judge signs ~~his~~ ballot affirmative, the plan gets passed, this problem gets solved, and, ... like we stop nuclear war. When the judge signs the ballot, nuclear war gets stopped. And I guess the problem with that is like back to like the objectivity thing, it disconnects you from the real world. Like **it takes away from what you as an individual person can do cause you’re constantly pretending to be something that you’re not.** And so, like, like what [theorist] Carrie Crenshaw says, like using your individual agency to fix problems that you know you have control over. .... By us taking advantage of our individual agency and talking about whiteness and bringing it to the forefront of discussions, like, we [he and his debate partner] do more action than you [an opponent] do, even if you pretend to do something. (Kenneth, interview, p. 19)